July 6th 2004
In a divided society like Iraq, the conventional
types of electoral system tend to produce ethnically based parties, which can exacerbate
the ethnic conflict. A new electoral system is therefore put forward, designed
to encourage the formation of pan-ethnic parties, moderate parties which are responsive to,
and which get their votes from, all ethnic groups. The system uses small constituencies
each electing one candidate. These constituencies are ethnically balanced, each consisting of an area inhabited by Shia, one
inhabited by Sunni, and one by Kurds. In each constituency, in order to get
elected, a candidate is required to get an adequate percentage of votes from each
of these ethnic areas.
A modified form of the system can be used to
guarantee single-party government, by electing one party to be the sole
government party.
If it is decided to have a national president elected
by popular vote, then the proposed electoral system could be used for this
purpose. This would provide the president with a strong pan-ethnic incentive,
promoting more equal responsiveness to each of the different communities into
which Iraq is divided.
Lastly, in order to strengthen
Iraq’s “civil society”, and to make the democratic system
more representative, a proposal is made for a scheme of elected and publicly
funded lobbies.
1. The need for pan-ethnic parties
In early 2005, Iraq is to hold a
popular election, in order to establish some form of democracy . However, Iraq
is an ethnically divided country, and in such countries, democracy rarely
functions well. Under the usual types of electoral system, the parties tend to
divide on the same ethnic lines as the electorate, and each party tends to
become mono-ethnic, that is, it draws its politicians from only one ethnic
group, and it appeals to and draws votes from only that ethnic group. Thus in
Iraq there is likely to be a set of Shia parties competing with each other for
Shia votes, a set of Sunni parties competing for Sunni votes, and a set of
Kurdish parties competing for Kurdish votes. The Shia parties, for example,
will have little incentive to respond to the needs of Sunni or Kurdish electors,
since even if they try, they will almost certainly be unable to obtain votes
from them. Thus ethnic extremism will be encouraged, and a party will have
little or no electoral incentive towards compromise. Indeed, such cooperation with
parties of the other ethnic groups can actually lose the party seats to a more
extreme party of the same ethnic group. This ethnic division between parties is
especially problematic where the parties of one ethnic group, the Shia, are
likely to get a majority of seats, enabling them to form an exclusively Shia
government, and perhaps retain it indefinitely, for election after
election.
If such a pan-ethnic system could be
achieved, the ethnic minorities would be well protected. If one party got a
majority of seats and formed the government, it would always be a pan-ethnic
party, and the government would be responsive to the needs of the ethnic
minorities, as well as to those of the majority. If no party obtained a
majority of seats, a normal majority coalition could be formed. Since the
parties would be pan-ethnic, there would be no need, in order to protect the
minority, to introduce special constitutional measures (which might be
unworkable and prone to deadlock), such as forming a “grand coalition” of all major
parties, or giving the parties of each ethnic group the power of veto.
2. The Distributed Alternative Vote
It is often asserted that the introduction of
democracy into a divided society is likely to exacerbate the ethnic conflict.
This assertion may well be justified, if the new democracy uses one of the
conventional electoral systems, which allow or even encourage the formation of
mono-ethnic parties. However, it is possible to design new electoral systems
which provide a strong incentive to form pan-ethnic parties, moderate parties
which are responsive to, and which get their votes from, all ethnic groups.
This paper proposes such a system for Iraq, which is referred to as the Distributed
Alternative Vote, or DAV
for short. DAV is a modification of the Alternative Vote (the system currently
used in Australia to elect the lower chamber of the legislature), this
modification being designed to provide the incentive for each party, and
also each candidate, to
get votes from each of the main ethnic groups, that is, from the Shia, from the
Sunni, and from the Kurds.
To explain DAV, we must first
explain the Alternative Vote on which it is based. The Alternative Vote uses
“single-member” constituencies, that is, ones which elect one
representative. Electors vote by putting the candidates standing in the constituency
in order of preference, writing in “1” against the first-preferred
candidate, “2” against the second-preferred, and so on. In the
first stage of the counting, each vote (that is, each ballot paper) is
allocated to the candidate for whom the voter has indicated first preference.
The candidate who has fewest votes is excluded, and his votes are transferred,
each vote going to that continuing candidate for whom the voter has indicated
next preference. The candidate who then has fewest votes is excluded. And so
on, for as many stages as are necessary, transferring votes and excluding a
candidate, until one candidate has at least half the total of votes held by the
continuing candidates, and is declared elected.
DAV is similar to the Alternative Vote in
that it uses single-member constituencies, and in that the electors vote by
putting the candidates in order of preference. However, under DAV, these
single-member constituencies are ethnically balanced. Each constituency consists of four separate areas,
referred to as “tracts”. Three of them are “ethnic”
tracts, of which one is inhabited by Shia, one by Sunni, and one by Kurds, and
the other is the “mixed” tract, where the electors are from several
different communities. The system is set up so that a candidate has the
incentive to get an about-equal percentage of votes from each of the ethnic
tracts in his constituency, that is, from the Shia, from the Sunni, and from
the Kurds.
In more detail, DAV takes advantage of the
fact that each of the three main ethnic groups have areas of concentration in
which they form 100 per cent, or fairly close to 100 per cent, of the
population. The Kurds have an area or areas of concentration in the north, the
Sunni in central Iraq, and the Shia in the south. Let us suppose that the
assembly to be elected has 300 members, so that 300 constituencies are
required. The Kurdish area of concentration is divided into 300 tracts, each
containing about the same number of electors. Similarly, 300 Sunni tracts and
300 Shia tracts are created, in their respective areas of concentration. The
remaining areas of the country, where the electors are from several different
communities, are divided up into 300 “mixed” tracts, each
containing about the same number of electors. Then 300 ethnically balanced
single-member constituencies are created, each constituency consisting of a
Kurdish (or at least nearly all Kurdish) tract, a Sunni tract, a Shia tract and
a mixed tract. (Note that a constituency will consist, not of one single
compact area as it does under other systems, but of four widely separated
areas.)
The method of election under DAV is as
follows, to elect the single representative for any one constituency. Each vote
is allocated to the candidate for whom the voter expresses first preference.
Each candidate’s number of “points” is then calculated,
points being a measure of the evenness of distribution of the candidate’s
votes between the different ethnic groups. A candidate’s number of points
is whichever is less, either two-thirds of his percentage of the votes in the whole constituency, or his lowest percentage of the votes in any
one of the three ethnic tracts. (For example, suppose a candidate gets 30 per
cent of the votes in the whole constituency, 10 per cent in the Kurdish tract,
40 per cent in the Sunni tract and 32 per cent in the Shia tract. Thus his
number of points will be the least of the following: two-thirds of 30 = 20, 10,
40, 32. That is, his number of points will be 10.)
The candidate with fewest points is
excluded, and each of his votes is transferred to the continuing candidate for
whom the voter expresses next preference (if there is a next preference
expressed). The points of each continuing candidate are recalculated, to take
account of the votes which have been transferred to them, and the candidate who
then has the lowest points is excluded. And so on, if necessary, at each stage
transferring votes, recalculating points, and excluding another candidate,
until only one candidate is left, who is declared elected.
3. The political effect of DAV
What then is the political effect of this new system
of DAV, as used to elect the assembly? Essentially, DAV operates by excluding,
at each stage of the counting, that candidate who has the lowest number of
“points”. A candidate’s number of points is whichever is
less, either two-thirds of his percentage of the votes in the whole constituency, or his lowest percentage in any of the three
ethnic tracts, Shia, Sunni or Kurdish. Thus any candidate who gets a percentage
of the votes from any one ethnic tract which is less than two-thirds of his
percentage in the whole constituency, will lose points, and will have a greater
risk of being excluded.
But what is the effect of this upon the parties?
In order to avoid having many of its candidates excluded, a party has the
incentive to get an adequate percentage of votes from each ethnic group, that
is, to get from each ethnic group at least two-thirds of the percentage it gets
over the whole nation. In other words, it has the incentive to become pan-ethnic, appealing to each ethnic group and getting its
votes about equally from each ethnic group.
If DAV is introduced, mono-ethnic parties
of different ethnic groups will have the incentive to merge to form pan-ethnic
parties, in the expectation that this will enable them to get more seats. Thus
a Kurdish party, a Sunni party and a Shia party might merge into one party, and
adopt a policy responsive to the needs of each of these ethnic groups, a compromise
between their different concerns. The party will place Kurdish candidates in
some constituencies, Sunni candidates in other constituencies, and Shia
candidates in others. This mix of candidates will help each candidate to get
votes from electors in his constituency who belong to ethnic groups other than
his own. A Kurdish candidate, for example, will be enabled to get more votes
from the electors of the Sunni and Shia tracts of his constituency, because
they will be reassured by the fact that in other constituencies, perhaps
neighbouring ones, his party has run Sunni and Shia candidates.
To investigate the workings of DAV in more
detail, let us consider the situation in one constituency, in which the
candidates of five parties are competing, these being K, U and S, three extreme
mono-ethnic parties, Kurdish, Sunni and Shia respectively, and M and N, two
pan-ethnic parties, each formed by the merger of a moderate Kurdish party with
a moderate Sunni party and a moderate Shia party. A likely election result
produced by this situation, is as follows.
In this constituency, a large majority of
voters in the Kurdish tract vote solely according to Kurdish interests, either
voting KMN (that is, K first, M second, N third) or KNM, while a minority of
them vote MNK or NMK, doing so either out of loyalty to the original Kurdish
parties which merged into M and N, or out of an active preference for
compromise and moderation. In the same way, a large majority of voters in the
Sunni tract vote UMN or UNM, and a minority of them vote MNU or NMU. Similarly,
a large majority in the Shia tract vote SMN or SNM and a minority MNS or NMS.
Very few voters in the Kurdish tract vote first preference for U or S,
certainly many fewer than the minority of them which votes first preference for
M, or for N. Similarly very few voters in the Sunni tract vote first preference
for K or S, or in the Shia tract for K or U.
In the first stage of the
vote-counting, each vote (that is, each ballot paper) is allocated to the
candidate it shows as first-preferred. K gets close to zero points, because of
his very low percentage of votes in the Sunni tract. Similarly, U gets very low
points because of a low percentage in the Shia tract, and S gets very low
points because of a low percentage in the Sunni tract. M and N get a greater
number of points, because each gets a more substantial percentage of votes in
each of the three ethnic tracts, Kurdish, Sunni and Shia. Of the five
candidates, K has fewest points, and so is excluded.
In the second stage, K’s votes,
almost all in the Kurdish tract and the mixed tract, are transferred, some
going to M and some to N. Of the four continuing candidates, U has fewest
points, and so is excluded.
In the third stage, U’s votes,
almost all in the Sunni tract and the mixed tract, are transferred, some to M
and some to N. Of the three continuing candidates, S has fewest points, and so
is excluded.
In the fourth stage, S’s votes,
almost all in the Shia tract and the mixed tract, are transferred, some to M
and some to N. M gets 48 per cent of the votes in the whole constituency, 55
per cent in the Kurdish tract, 51 in the Sunni tract and 47 in the Shia tract.
Thus M will have points equal to the least of the following: two-thirds of 48 =
32, 55, 51, 47, that is, points equal to 32. Similarly, N gets 52 per cent of
the votes in the whole constituency, 45 in the Kurdish tract, 49 in the Sunni
tract and 53 in the Shia tract. Thus M will have points equal to the least of
the following: two-thirds of 52 = 34.67, 45, 49, 53, that is, points equal to
34.67. Thus M has fewer points, and so is excluded, and N is declared elected.
This example illustrates how, under
DAV, when pan-ethnic parties and mono-ethnic parties are competing for a seat,
the pan-ethnic parties have the advantage, and the seat goes to one of the
pan-ethnic parties. Note that this moderate result is achieved, even when a
large majority of voters are extremists, voting first preference for one or
other type of extreme mono-ethnic party. The explanation for this apparent
paradox is that while the candidate of a pan-ethnic party gets a moderate
percentage of votes from each ethnic group, the candidate of an ethnically
extreme party gets a very low percentage from voters of other ethnic groups, and so gets
excluded. Another factor explaining the success of pan-ethnic parties is that
when the first-preferred candidate of these extremist electors is excluded,
their votes are passed on to their second preference, a moderate pan-ethnic
candidate.
But it may well be asked, will these
putatively extremist electors in fact be prepared to vote second preference for
a moderate candidate, or indeed to express a second preference at all? At least
when they become familiar with the system, most of them will surely realise
that their second preference will be used only when their first-preferred
candidate is excluded and has no chance of election, and that by using their
second preferences they will help to elect a candidate they prefer more, in
place of a candidate they prefer less. In particular, they are likely to be
concerned to prevent the election of an extreme candidate of another ethnic
group, if there seems any possibility of this. Thus it can be expected that
most electors will be prepared to express their second and lower preferences,
and that as a consequence, DAV will operate in favour of the pan-ethnic
parties, in the manner illustrated by this example.
Clearly, DAV gives any mono-ethnic party a
powerful incentive to broaden its appeal, and become pan-ethnic. If the party
does not do this, it will simply lose its seats to more pan-ethnic parties.
Thus in a short time, perhaps even at the first election, the use of DAV can be
expected to produce a legislature consisting of pan-ethnic parties, ensuring a
moderate government which is responsive to each ethnic group.
We have seen that DAV promotes moderation
in respect of ethnic concerns. But what is the effect of DAV in respect of any
other dimension on which the electors might differ, such as the “left-to-right”
dimension? For example, consider two parties, both equally pan-ethnic, but one
a centre party and one to the right. Their candidates are competing in the
final two-candidate stage of the vote-counting under DAV, all other candidates
having previously been excluded. The candidate of the centre party will tend to
beat the candidate of the right-wing party, getting a majority of votes
comprising not only centre but also left-wing electors. Similarly, a centre
candidate will tend to beat one to the left. DAV thus provides an incentive to
move towards a centre or moderate position, on any dimension on which the
electors differ.
The conclusion of this
investigation is that DAV can be expected to exert over time, on each party and
each candidate, a steady incentive towards compromise and moderation, towards a
policy responsive to the needs of each group, and towards a centre or moderate
position, not only on the ethnic dimension, but also on any other dimension
which is of importance to the electors. DAV can thus be expected to promote
convergence in policy between parties, towards this moderate centre position.
This convergence between parties has implications for the stability of
government. If two parties get all or nearly all the seats in the assembly, and
alternate in office as single-party governments, then because there is little
difference in policy between government and opposition, the electorate will
tend to give more willing consent to be governed, and the changeover between
parties in office will tend to be less disruptive. If on the other hand no
party gets a majority of seats, and a coalition has to be formed, these
moderate and convergent parties will more easily be able to form a government,
and that government can be expected to be stable and effective, and responsive
to each ethnic group.
4. DAV with guaranteed single-party government
Under DAV, as under any other
single-member-constituency system, it is difficult for smaller parties to get
seats, even if they are pan-ethnic, since their candidates tend to get a lower
percentage of votes and so are more likely to get excluded. Thus smaller
parties will tend to lose seats to larger ones, and it is likely, though not
certain, that after several elections, one party will get a majority of seats
and will be able to provide single-party government. However, if it is wished
to have a guarantee of single-party government even from the first election,
this can be achieved by the following modified form of DAV, which elects one
party to be the sole government party.
Ethnically
balanced constituencies are created as before, each consisting of three ethnic
tracts and one mixed tract. Electors vote by putting the candidates in order of
preference, as before. However, in the counting of the votes, one party is
elected as the sole government party by the same DAV procedure as was used to
elect an individual candidate, but here applied to the ballot papers of the
whole nation (a vote for a candidate being counted also as a vote for the
candidate’s party). Thus the whole nation is treated as one national
constituency, consisting of four tracts, a national Shia tract consisting of
all 300 Shia tracts, and similarly a national Sunni tract, a national Kurdish
tract, and a national “mixed” tract.
Only parties which have placed a candidate
in each constituency are considered for election as government party. Votes are
allocated each to its first-preferred candidate. Each party’s number of
“points” is calculated. A party’s number of points is
whichever is less, either two-thirds of its percentage of the votes in the whole national
constituency, or its
lowest percentage of the votes in any one of the three ethnic national tracts,
Shia, Sunni or Kurdish. The party with fewest points is excluded, and each of
its votes is transferred to the continuing party for which the voter expresses
next preference (if there is a next preference expressed). The points of each
continuing party are recalculated, to take account of the votes which have been
transferred to it, and the party which then has the lowest points is excluded.
And so on, for as many stages as is necessary, transferring votes,
recalculating points, and excluding another party, until only one party is
left, which is declared elected as the sole government party. The party elected
as government party is assigned a fixed minimum majority of seats, let us say
54 per cent (which will be 162 seats in an assembly of 300).
It
is then determined which of the individual candidates are to be elected to the
assembly. For this, the points of each candidate in each constituency of the
nation are calculated, by
the same formula as used before for calculating the points of the candidates.
The candidate who has fewest points in the whole nation is excluded, and each of his votes is
transferred to that continuing candidate in the same constituency for whom the
voter expresses next preference. The points of each continuing candidate are
recalculated to take account of the votes transferred, and the candidate who
then has fewest points in the whole nation is excluded. And so on, transferring
votes, recalculating points, and excluding the candidate with fewest points in
the whole nation, until either there is only one candidate left in each constituency and each of them
is declared elected, or the number of continuing candidates of the elected government party is reduced
down to its fixed minimum majority. In the latter case, the candidates of the
government party are declared elected, and in the other constituencies,
exclusions continue of the candidates with fewest points, until there is only
one candidate left in each constituency, and each of them is declared
elected.
This
form of DAV thus elects, as the sole government party, the party with most
“points” on a national basis, and guarantees this party a minimum
majority of seats, which are given to those of its candidates who have obtained
most points. Thus single-party government is guaranteed, and this government
party, and also each of its candidates, has the incentive to be pan-ethnic,
fully responsive to each community, Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish.
5. Election of the president by DAV
If DAV is adopted as the electoral system for the
assembly, then this could be expected to provide a more coherent parliamentary
system, such as to obviate the need for a popularly elected president. However,
if it is nevertheless decided to institute a popularly elected president, then
whatever the electoral system used for the assembly, this paper would recommend
that DAV (of the same form as that proposed for election of the sole government
party) should be used to elect the president. This would provide the president
with a strong pan-ethnic incentive, motivating him to respond more equally to
each of the different communities into which Iraq is divided.
6. Advisory Representatives
An assembly elected by DAV will consist of generalist
parties, ones which seek a compromise policy acceptable to all parts of the
electorate, rather than seek to articulate and represent the needs of particular
sections. There will be an absence of niche parties, parties which cater for
some special interest or section, and there might be some dissatisfaction with
this, especially if the comparison is made with some forms of proportional
representation, which would allow diverse small parties to get elected, to
match the divisions in the electorate.
One answer to this problem might be to
have, along with the DAV-elected legislature, a second chamber elected by some
form of proportional representation, with powers in the legislative process in
parallel with those of the first chamber. However, this arrangement would tend
to create a situation of frequent conflict between the two chambers, especially
if, as would be likely, this second chamber consisted largely of mono-ethnic
parties from different ethnic groups.
Therefore, this paper proposes, as an
adjunct to the DAV-elected legislature, a system of elected Advisory Representatives, who have only consultative status, and are without any actual powers
in the legislative or governmental process. In brief, electors vote for these
Advisory Representatives (ARs for short), and the ARs are paid income in
proportion to these votes. Thus with this income, the ARs have both the
incentive, and the resources, to lobby on behalf of the electors who have voted
for them.
To explain the scheme in more detail, the
elector has one vote, which he may give to one AR, or may split between any
number of ARs, in any way he likes. Each AR’s total of votes is then
found, and he is given a certain amount of income for each vote obtained (let
us say, for each vote, 1/3000 of the average per-person income in Iraq).
However, there are two exceptions: (1) the AR gets no income if he gets fewer
votes than some minimum, let us say 500; (2) he gets no more income than some
maximum, let us say six times the average income.
The voting is carried out not by use of
the normal ballot paper, but by the "coupon" method, which is as
follows. A coupon is printed for each AR, at the AR’s expense, and it
bears the AR's name and message, and most important, his personal
bar-code. The ARs distribute their
coupons to electors they think might vote for them, and also make their coupons
available at any polling stations where they think they might have support. The
elector votes in the privacy of the polling booth by putting the appropriate
coupons in a special envelope provided to him by the polling officer, putting
in more than one coupon for a given AR if he wishes. To count the votes, each
envelope is opened, and the coupons in it are read by a bar-code reader
attached to a computer, which calculates the total votes of each AR. For
example, if an elector has put in his envelope one coupon from A and two
coupons from B, this will be counted as one-third of a vote for A and
two-thirds of a vote for B.
The coupon method should be used for the
first election of the Advisory ARs. But in later elections, a ballot paper
could be used, bearing the names of those ARs who got most votes in that area
in the previous election (let us say the top 50 ARs). Any other ARs who sought
support in the area could also be voted for, but only by means of coupons.
How then can these Advisory
Representatives be expected to operate in practice, and what functions can they
be expected to perform? Since they will have no powers in the legislative
process, and since they will be extremely diverse in their interests and
concerns, it seems unlikely that they will want to meet as a body, in the same
way as a conventional second chamber would do. Instead, the ARs will act
separately, each lobbying on behalf of the electors who have voted for them
with government or parliament or perhaps with business, operating in a similar
way to the interest groups which exist at present.
These ARs will be better able to
articulate the various interests that exist in society, than would any large
generalist party, which would be primarily concerned to find a compromise which
had wide support. The ARs will be continually seeking new interests and causes
to represent, in order to attract votes from electors who support them. Thus
latent interests which at present are not organised at all, will be articulated
and will then be able to exert influence. This scheme can be expected to reduce
the likelihood of demonstrations and riots, since it provides an alternative
way, one which is more peaceful and probably more effective, of making known to
the authorities the needs and grievances of the people.
In conclusion, the Advisory Representatives scheme can be regarded as a means of developing and strengthening Iraq's "civil society". It is a neutral procedure for introducing public money into the informal aspects of the democratic process, which could make the democratic system vastly more representative, while avoiding the potential bias of arbitrary grants.
Democracy Design Forum, Coles House, Buxhall, Stowmarket, Suffolk IP14 3EB, UK